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the scope and life-span of the Atherton case, during the Haddock
regime. There has never been any formulation of general principles concerning matrimonial domicile; nor has there been any
legal concept of a continuing matrimonial domicile until replaced
by a "new" matrimonial domicile. The idea in the principal case
has no historical foundation; whether it will have any future
significance remains to be seen.
In the case of Interdiction of Toca 4 another unexpected idea
is the distinction drawn between the "actual domicile, the domicilium habitationis" and the "merely legal or constructive domicile." The question of the jurisdiction of a Louisiana court to
interdict a person whose last legal domicile was in Louisiana
but who has been an inmate of a mental institution for nineteen
years in another state, is discussed elsewhere in this symposium.5
However, the distinction between these domiciles is doubly unexpected: in the first place, because the significance of domicile,
especially in conflict of laws, has always been as a legal concept
(distinguished from the physical fact of residence); and secondly,
because the distinction here made is not borne out by the case
cited as its source." However, the idea in the principal case may
have a different explanation or unexplored possibilities.
CORPORATIONS
Dale E. Bennett*
RECEIVERSHIP FOR MISMANAGEMENT

The protection of minority shareholders includes a special
statutory right to apply for a receivership where minority rights
are jeopardized by gross mismanagement or misapplication of
funds by the officers, directors and majority stockholders.' The
appointment of a receiver, however, is a harsh and expensive
remedy which will not be decreed unless the need for such relief
4. 217 La. 465, 46 So. 2d 737 (1950).

5. See comments on this case in section on Persons (Interdiction), infra
p. 177.

6. In the earlier case of Interdiction of Dumas, 32 La. Ann. 679 (1880),
the court was examining the text of Article 392 of the Civil Code, providing
that "Every interdiction shall be pronounced by the competent judge of the
domicile or residence of the person to be interdicted," and the court there

concluded that this provision "contemplates that such domicile or residence
should be, as a rule, the place of abode of such person, the locus habitationis,
the place where the body can be found and reached, within the territorial
limits of the court itself, and, as an exception, the place of the bona fide
abode, intentional or accidental, of such person within the national boundaries of the sovereignty which the court represents." (32 La. Ann. 679, 682.)
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Act 159 of 1898 (La. R.S. [1950] 12:751-761).
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is clearly established. In Kinnebrew v. Louisiana Ice Company2
the petitioning minority shareholders fell far short of establishing a right to this exceptional relief. The facts, elaborately set
out in the trial judge's written opinion, which was adopted by
the supreme court, indicated that the defendant majority group
had taken a hopelessly insolvent corporation, had breathed new
life into the business by the furnishing of funds necessary to
stave off clamoring creditors and to rehabilitate the physical
plant, and had even transformed the corporate venture to the
status of a moderately profitable business. While there were
certain informalities in the present management, the net result
was clearly superior to the financial disaster which the plaintiff's
prior management had almost brought about. In refusing to
grant a receivership, the court stressed the fact that there had
been no claim or showing that the plaintiff's rights were being
destroyed or diminished, and further declared that the statutory
grounds for the appointment of a receiver were "not mandatory,
but are subject to judicial discretion, and a receiver should not
be appointed, except in cases where it is evident that such
'3
appointment will serve some useful purpose.
Various grounds of alleged mismanagement were considered
by the court. Some were found to be unsupported by proof and
others to constitute a proper exercise of business judgment. The
borrowing of money from the majority shareholder's family was
proper, since the funds were not obtainable elsewhere and the
loans had clearly saved the corporation from immediate liquidation. The informal management of the corporate affairs by the
husband of the majority stockholder who had lent the corporation $175,000, appeared to be a logical method of protecting the
creditor's rights without the necessity of an expensive receivership. The corporate books, as alleged by the plaintiff, had not
been kept in orthodox manner. However, there was no evidence
that the loose system of bookkeeping had resulted in any misuse
or co-mingling of corporate funds. In fact, very creditable testimony indicated a completely honest method of accounting. In
this connection the court declared that "the fact that a corporation fails to keep a complete set of books and records was not
ipso facto such gross mismanagement as to require the appoint' 4
ment of a receiver.
2. 216 La. 472, 43 So. 2d 798 (1949).
3. 216 La. 472, 486, 43 So. 2d 798, 803, quoting from Duval v. T.P. Ranch
Co., 151 La. 142, 151, 91 So. 656, 659 (1922).
4. 216 La. 472, 494, 43 So. 2d 798, 805.

